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Cognition, Incentives,
and Public Governance
Laboratory Federalism from
the Organizational Viewpoint
Giampaolo Garzarelli
Università degli Studi di Roma,
“La Sapienza,” Rome, Italy
The second-generation theory (SGT) of fiscal federalism, which draws upon
contemporary economic and industrial organization theory, hitherto focuses
only on the negative benefits of public decentralization: the potentially supe-
rior ability to align perverse incentives vis-à-vis the centralized governance
alternative. The SGT neglects the positive benefits of decentralization (mistake-
ridden learning, flexibility, and option discovery), although the limitations of
organization theory do not justify such neglect. By likening intergovernmen-
tal grants to incomplete contracts, this work shows that the SGT can include
the laboratory nature of decentralization.
Keywords: experimentation; incomplete contracts; intergovernmental grants;
learning; second-generation theory of fiscal federalism
[The] basic problem facing public and private policy [consists in] the design
of institutional arrangements that provide incentives to encourage experi-
mentation (including the development of new products, knowledge, and new
ways of organizing activities) without overly insulating these experiments
from the ultimate test of survival.
—Harold Demsetz (1969, 20)
According to public economic theory, one of the benefits that derivesfrom fiscal federalism—or the economic decentralization of public
governance—is that it can act as a laboratory of rapid trial-and-error learn-
ing for public policy.1 Viscount Bryce’s contention is a classic synthesis of
this belief. “Federalism enables a people to try experiments in legislation
and administration which could not be safely tried in a large centralized
country. A comparatively small commonwealth like an American state
easily makes and unmakes its laws; mistakes are not serious, for they are
soon corrected; other states profit by the experience of a law or a method
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which has worked well or ill in the state that has tried it” (Bryce [1888]
2004, 257).2
Until now, the primary theoretical framework employed to study the belief
that ascribes a beneficial cognitive role to decentralization originates from
public economics (Rose-Ackerman 1980; Strumpf 2002). This article takes a
different tack. Its main objective is to discuss the laboratory role of fiscal fed-
eralism not from the more familiar public economics viewpoint but from an
organizational viewpoint.
Recently, Oates (1999, 1120) suggested that we can think of the theory
of fiscal federalism organizationally: as a theory about the division of labor
between the local governments and the central one. Others have conducted
studies where fiscal federalism is viewed as mainly a problem of organiza-
tional design. Drawing on principal-agent, new institutional (or transaction
cost) economics, and new property rights theories, this line of work is basi-
cally interested in determining the organizational alternatives best suited
to minimize the deadweight losses generated by the pervasive misaligned
incentives present in public organization.3 These insightful studies repre-
sent an important first step in demonstrating that public economics is not
the only useful theoretical framework to study public decentralization.
Qian and Weingast (1997) dub this emerging literature that tries to look
at fiscal federalism in more explicit organizational terms as the second-
generation theory (SGT) of fiscal federalism. This article is a contribution to
the SGT. Studying fiscal federalism does not merely mean analyzing the
negative benefits of federalism (i.e., incentive alignment), but also the posi-
tive ones (i.e., mistake-ridden learning). What should accordingly occupy
our attention is not only a comparative institutional analysis hinging on the
minimization of rent seeking costs but also a comparative institutional
analysis hinging on the generation of productive contexts. Various forms of
economic organization may surely arise for limiting unproductive behaviors
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originating from various sources (e.g., from indivisibilities in team production,
from soft budget constraints). However, they may also arise to channel and
generate productive behaviors in various ways (Pelikan 1988; Langlois
2002; Langlois and Foss 1999; Langlois and Robertson 1995).
Yet, no work has addressed the positive role of fiscal federalism from an
organizational viewpoint. One way to balance the situation within the SGT
is to consider problems of incentives (or commitments) in conjunction with
problems of cognition. Since self-interest cannot be eliminated completely,
efficacious economic organization must simultaneously address both prob-
lems: the use and discovery of the appropriate knowledge about how to
achieve desired objectives and the properly aligned incentives to act on the
appropriate knowledge. As Madison writes in Paper No. 62 of The Federalist,
a “good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of govern-
ment, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of the
means by which that object can be best attained” (Hamilton, Jay, and Madison
[1787-1788] 2001, 322).
In this spirit, this article addresses, through the prism of the economics
of organization, the positive role that public decentralization can play.
Briefly stated, my position is that the SGT needs also to consider the cog-
nitive advantages (adaptation, trial-and-error learning, experimentation)
that fiscal federalism—if compared to its unitary alternative—can yield in
concomitance with its incentive alignment advantages. This includes ascer-
taining preferred fiscal (and other public, including incentive mechanism
design) institutional and organizational choices that, under currently under-
stood alternatives, may not even be known.
Old and New Theories of Fiscal Federalism
According to received theory, a fundamental role of the central govern-
ment in a federation is to offset, by means of a subsidy, the external effects
that may emerge among local governments. For instance, paving a road in
one jurisdiction may create beneficial effects in another jurisdiction and thus
generate the problem of interjurisdictional internalization. In cases such as
this, the central government intervenes by subsidizing the local government
with Pigouvian unit subsidies (or matching grants) to internalize the exter-
nal benefits. The beneficiary government will solve the spillover problem
by ensuring that the spatial production scope of the local public good will
overlap with the spatial consumption scope of that same local public good
or, seen from a different viewpoint, until the federation’s marginal social
benefits equal marginal cost.
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Plainly, this is a policy answer that rests on a traditional market failure
argument the presumption of which is that both central and local govern-
ments act in the public interest. The central discontent that currently moti-
vates the SGT literature regards the presumption innate in cases such as the
one illustrated by this example. Much like the neoclassical theory of the
firm before Coase (1937), previous approaches to fiscal federalism—or
so-called first-generation theory (FGT) of federalism—consider the state
as nothing more than a black box. This black box interpretation, where the
assumed innate benevolence of government solves all problems, is trace-
able to the Arrow, Musgrave, and Samuelson public finance tradition.4
Inspired especially by de Tocqueville ([1835] 1990), Oates’s Fiscal
Federalism (1972) is the classic theoretical statement of such tradition
within the FGT. Implicitly taking the question of the internal structure of
the state as a residual, Oates’s normative proposition, known as the “decen-
tralization theorem,” establishes that “in the absence of cost-savings from
the centralized provision of a good and of interjurisdictional external
effects, the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically
higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption of the good are provided
in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is
maintained across all jurisdictions. In this way the theorem establishes, in
the absence of other kinds of offsetting benefits from centralized control, a
presumption in favor of decentralized finance” (Oates 1972, 54, original
emphasis). The justification, by Oates’s (1999, 1122-4) own admission, is
disarmingly simple. There’s a higher probability of matching local public
good demand if public good supply is not centralized (i.e., uniform across
jurisdictions). When the theorem does not hold, the central government,
acting in the public interest, will internalize interjurisdictional externalities
via grants-in-aid.
The SGT claims that the public interest view innate into the FGT exists
because of the exogeneity of state organization. But if we look inside the
black box of state organization, continues the SGT, then it follows that the
three putative roles of allocation, distribution, and stabilization confined to
the state by the FGT are performed by a complex public organization that
is characterized by more problems than the familiar theory of public eco-
nomics would lead us to conclude. As a result, investigative efforts should
be more focused on studying the state qua organization: state structure,
similarly to firm structure, is an organizational design problem. And the
point is that often the practical workings of the implemented organizational
design are not smooth: various problems (e.g., corruption, shirking, oppor-
tunism) plague state and firm organization alike.
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In particular, the SGT highlights how organization theory can offer use-
ful insights into various problems of perverse incentives (or weak commit-
ments) innate in the structure of the public sector. The basic assumption, in
fact, is that public organizations are not populated by individuals (bureau-
crats, ministers, political representatives) who always necessarily pursue
the common good but by individuals who also have utility-maximizing
agendas of their own. As a result, the challenge is to design organizations
(e.g., federal states) and institutions (e.g., constitutions) that cure such
problems by aligning various types of perverse incentives (or creating more
credible commitments). Decentralization of public governance could be
seen as the “best way to create incentives for politicians to differentiate ade-
quately between the needs of different groups of their citizens” (Seabright
1996, 64).
This is not to say that in economics and political science there were not
earlier approaches putting forth similar ideas. The earliest contribution
proposing the explicit use of organization theory is arguably Boschken
(1982). Moreover, the Public Choice school made public organization writ
large a substantial part of its research program (Vanberg and Buchanan
1986; Breton [1985] 1987, 1996; Breton and Scott 1978).5 Likewise, the
work of Ostrom and coauthors in political science was equally forerunning
(Ostrom 1987; Ostrom and Ostrom 1965; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren
1961).6 A more recent related model is the law and economics one by
Cooter (2000).
Germane approaches notwithstanding, the SGT remains a major step
forward because of the many novel insights it derives from a well-developed
body of theory that exists in economic and industrial organization. Yet, at
its current stage, the SGT leaves out the laboratory role of fiscal federalism,
even though there is no concrete theoretical reason or objective limitation
that renders this ineluctable.
A contemporary industrial and economic organization literature exists,
even if perhaps less known, that is able to complement the SGT so as to
accommodate the positive (cognitive) as well as the negative (incentive)
role of public decentralization. This literature is inspired by contributions
that, to a large extent, overlap with those of the better known incentive
alignment approach.7 In a nutshell, it sees differential knowledge, innova-
tion (organizational, technological, of policy), specialization, and mistake-
ridden learning as central explanatory variables.8
More generally, this literature points out that different governance struc-
tures not only differ in their ability to internalize externalities but also dif-
fer in their ability to create externalities in the form of productive contexts
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not otherwise achievable. In this literature, moreover, the role of incomplete
contracts—the institutional complement of economic organization—is not
just about who should have the property rights of decision making on the
basis of a least welfare loss criterion. The complementary role of incom-
plete contracts also manifests itself in the comparative ability of alternative
governance structures to facilitate adaptation to positive contingencies.
Once the purpose of alternative structures is cast in these other terms, we
see that a framework that has been produced for the study of organization
can be adapted for our purposes.
Somewhat paradoxically, we shall see in what follows that—at the level
of the motivation for decentralization—the cognitive approach innate in my
discussion accords more with the FGT (Oates 1972, 1999) than with the
SGT as developed so far. Yet, at the substantive level—that is, at the level
about how agents acquire and possess knowledge—we shall see that the
FGT makes knowledge assumptions that are stronger than those that it makes
at the level of motivation. For example, the FGT assumes central government
ignorance about local preferences but not about national ones, and this obvi-
ously raises some problems about the general ability of a central govern-
ment to internalize interjurisdictional spillovers by means of Pigouvian
subsidies. Still, this does not simultaneously mean that the SGT has, until
now, necessarily provided a satisfactory answer to such a cognitive prob-
lem. For instance, the SGT does not at all envision an organizational role
for intergovernmental grants (Oates forthcoming).
A part of my argument conversely proposes that it is possible to consider
grants as the fiscal federalism counterpart of incomplete contracts. Such par-
allel, i.e., grants as incomplete contracts, suggests that the degree of vague-
ness inherent in different types of grants can actually serve as a control
variable for policy to create incentives to search for and learn about previously
unknown alternatives. In brief, during our exploration of the broader organi-
zational role of fiscal federalism, we will also be led to an institutional explo-
ration of intergovernmental grants, which the FGT treats in noninstitutional
terms and the current SGT, to the best of my knowledge, simply has not con-
sidered yet.
Colocation in Economic Organization
Analogously to the FGT, the primary motivation behind the organiza-
tional approach to fiscal federalism followed here regards the inability to
obtain a one-to-one correspondence between the spatial consumption of a
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public good and the full payment for such consumption. One reformulation of
such deficiency in “fiscal equivalence”—to use Olson’s (1969) expression—
is to ask what information or knowledge barriers impede a market clearing
as well as what mechanism design options are at our disposal to overcome
such barriers.
A fundamental barrier to fiscal equivalence may itself be organizational.
When Oates remarks with reference to Tiebout’s (1956) approach that the
optimal amount of public good provision varies with jurisdiction, notwith-
standing mobility, he is making exactly this claim.9
[The] gains from decentralization, although typically enhanced by . . . mobility,
are by no means wholly dependent on them. . . . In fact, if there were absolutely
nothing mobile—households, factors, or whatever—there would still exist, in
general, gains from decentralization. The point here is simply that even in the
absence of mobility, the efficient level of output of a “local” public good, as
determined by the Samuelson condition that the sum of the marginal rates of
substitution equals marginal cost, will typically vary from one jurisdiction to
another. To take one example, the efficient level of air quality in Los Angeles
is surely much different from that in, say, Chicago. (Oates 1999, 1124; empha-
sis added)
This observation that sneaks comparative institutional reasoning in the
back door is not inconsequential. This is so for two related reasons. First, it
focuses attention on different organizational arrangements for the obviation
not only of physical and spatial externalities, such as nuisance and pollu-
tion, but also of those concerning production and exchange—or, in a word,
knowledge. Second, the emphasis on knowledge externalities does not a
priori rule out that some organizational arrangements emerge not only to
obviate detrimental but also to generate beneficial externalities of the same
(and other) type.10 This other reading of the problem of fiscal federalism
enables us to more explicitly consider its laboratory or cognitive role from
the organizational viewpoint.
Jensen and Meckling (1992, 251) assert that efficacious economic orga-
nization must solve two different kinds of problems: “the rights assignment
problem (determining who should exercise a decision right), and the con-
trol or agency problem (how to ensure that self-interested decision agents
exercise their rights in a way that contributes to the organizational objec-
tive).” Efficacious economic organization then requires that the appropriate
knowledge and decision rights dovetail or, as they say, colocate. The ways
that such colocation of rights to act and knowledge can take place are fun-
damentally two: one “is by moving the knowledge to those with the decision
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rights; the other is by moving the decision rights to those with the knowledge”
(Jensen and Meckling 1992, 253).
We may think of these two available options to address the colocation prob-
lem as being the institutional constraints of the problem of economic organi-
zation. In different terms, the possible colocations of rights and knowledge
define the possible variants of (private as well as public) organizational choices.
Given such constraint, one “efficiency” criterion to evaluate organizational
forms on a comparative basis may reside in their relative ability to facilitate
colocation of knowledge and decision making, a criterion seldom considered
in the literature.
These considerations are important for the remainder of the discussion.
But before proceeding, allow me to be a little more precise by drawing on
both Jensen and Meckling (1992) and Langlois (2002).
The colocation of decision rights to knowledge is possible only in markets.
The market permits one to sell or exchange the decision rights that accompany
his or her knowledge to act. This is not possible in internal organization. For
example, a bureaucrat or politician cannot (legally) sell (or exchange) his or
her job to someone else and capture proceeds from such alienation. So in a
market the division of labor among the actors is defined not by central design
but spontaneously through the various interactions of the actors involved.
At the same time, the colocation of knowledge to decision rights can
instead take place in various ways in internal organization; that is, there are
several internal organization governance structures that colocate knowledge
to decision rights, implying that in this case the difference among gover-
nance structures resides in the degree of decision right autonomy rather than
in the direction of the colocation per se. For instance, we may have that the
ultimate decision rights are strongly centralized, such as in the case of fordist
production (a rigid vertical organization of the division of labor) or of a uni-
tary form of government. This can take place because the knowledge that
needs to be transmitted among the actors is not (or believed to be not) large
in quantity and because the tasks that need to be performed are well defined
and not complicated. Even in cases where tasks are more complicated but
still well defined, centralized division of labor is still feasible. The point here
is that the ultimate decision rights stay on top of the hierarchy, notwith-
standing the fact that a few basic rights are distributed along the way.
But within the colocation of knowledge to the decision rights institu-
tional constraint—namely, the internal organization option—there are also
more decentralized alternatives available. One straightforward illustration
is a strategic network alliance composed of different firms that desire to
share some know-how. In this case, ultimate decision rights are present both
242 Public Finance Review
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across and within the allied firms. For example, allied automobile firms
may, for a period of time, share the ultimate decision rights about which
common chassis design to adopt for a line of their automobile models.
Simultaneously, however, the manufactures have the ultimate decision rights
to pursue different individual strategic plans, as actually occurred in the
case of FIAT, Renault, Saab, and Volvo in Europe some years ago. Another
obvious example that comes to mind is a university. In a university, we have
different departments, each having ultimate decision rights about how to
organize their own majors. Nonetheless, the majors must be compatible
with the courses and majors offered in other departments, with the university-
wide general education program, with the overall mission of the university,
and with external accreditation agencies.
The more pertinent example, of course, is fiscal federalism. So long as
the objectives of local jurisdictions do not, for example, conflict with those
established by the federal constitution, in this governance structure, some
knowledge to ultimate decision rights to act is delegated to the local juris-
dictions in the attempt to reach and maintain fiscal equivalence. When fis-
cal equivalence is not maintained through time because, say, some novel
unexpected problem crops up, it may be necessary to experiment with mul-
tiple knowledge to rights colocation solutions in order to return to fiscal
equivalence. Differently put, it may be necessary to try out multiple degrees
of decentralization.
Thus, the rights to knowledge to act and the knowledge to rights to act are
the fundamental rules of the organizational game. But while the former option
applies only to markets, there are a variety of internal organization governance
structures to which the latter can apply. In consequence, the rights/knowledge
distinction lets us define the governance structures according to the extent
of decentralization/centralization rather than according to decentralization
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or centralization as such. Figure 1 offers a summary of colocation options
(or institutional constraints) and governance structures.
The main focus of this article is the right-hand box of Figure 1. We can
more precisely illustrate such focus along an x-axis, as in Figure 2. The vari-
ous types of internal organization may be distinguished according to the
degree of decision right autonomy. For example, we would expect nonfederal
countries, such as Denmark, France, Greece, Japan, and Tunisia, to stand
somewhere on the left side of the spectrum and federal countries, such as
Canada, Germany, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United States, to stand
somewhere on the center-right of the spectrum.
In other words, the degree of decision right autonomy in internal organi-
zation is not a binary variable or an “all-or-nothing” trade-off (centralize or
decentralize?). Rather, though several internal organization alternatives from
which to choose from may be known to us or not be beyond our imagination,
“good organization” requires that the degree of decision right autonomy per
se be, to borrow Hayek’s ([1968] 1978) terminology, a discovery procedure
(as the bidirectional lines in Figure 2 try to indicate).11
For an individual organization, this means that the degree of decision right
autonomy may depend on the nature of the problem that needs to be solved.
The more ill defined the problem that we face, the more likely it is that we
may need to discover new knowledge to solve it,12 for in uncertain environ-
ments what matters the most is not optimization but adaptation (Nelson and
Winter 1977; Dosi 1988; Pelikan 1988; Langlois 2002). Adaptation (whether
one considers private or public organizational contexts13) may require invest-
ing in the knowledge of others through increased decentralization.14
Such suggested approach to comparing organizational alternatives res-
onates with the FGT. The “most useful way for an economist to approach”
fiscal federalism “is to treat federalism not in absolute but in relative terms.”
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We “can envision a spectrum of structures of the public sector along which
the difference is essentially one of degree rather than kind. At one end of the
spectrum is a unitary form of government with all decisions made by the
central authority, and at the opposite pole is a state of anarchy. Aside from
the two polar points themselves, the other positions on the spectrum repre-
sent federal organizations of the public sector moving from a greater to a
lesser degree of centralization of decision-making” (Oates 1972, 18).
Perhaps more interesting, the approach resonates with the SGT as well.
The more we move toward more decentralization along Figure 2, the more
we approximate a Coase theorem-like result—arguably, the governance
structure closest to the pure market one of the left-hand box of Figure 1.
The closer we are to such result, the more likely that the familiar incentive
problem will be solved. Why? Because the more a right becomes alienable,
the more likely we are to operate under a governance structure that is able
to communicate the value of the right in every point in time. If this is the
case, then the incentives for the possessor of the right to act to use it capa-
bly are crowded in automatically. (We will return to the point below.) There
is a complementary aspect. If incentives are crowded in automatically, then
some cognitive attention is spontaneously redirected from limiting perverse
incentives toward other tasks, such as those involving option discovery
through learning from experimentation.15
So, what is often at stake are both the alignment of incentives in the face
of well-defined situations and the ability to continuously take advantage
of differential knowledge when the challenge faced is ill defined. In such
ill-defined cases, as discussed presently, the devolution of tasks widens the
learning function to include not just one’s failures and successes but that of
others too. Take note that such widening of options does not exclude the
discovery of new incentives that, per se, may stimulate the search for nov-
elty. Framing matters in these terms gives a more explicit flexibility or ver-
satility twist to the organizational approach of the SGT.
Longer, Incomplete Contracts
as Incentives to Experiment
Our thesis—that, because uncertain problems incorporate difficult ones,
the positive heuristic of the SGT should simultaneously include the cogni-
tive as well as the incentive alignment role played by fiscal federalism—has
brought to the fore the possibility of sketching a division of labor between
the central government and the local ones from a different angle.
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This different angle suggests that the problem of economic organization
in a federal system should be approached according to a knowledge-to-rights-
to-act colocation criterion. Such a criterion in turn implies that one way for
federalism to act as a laboratory is to experiment with different combina-
torics between knowledge and rights to act in internal organization. Now
the question is, how do we create incentives for such experimentation? Or,
posing the same question somewhat more precisely, what institutional
instruments are at our disposal to stimulate the search for novelty in a fed-
erally organized political governance structure?
This is a multifaceted question that we will attempt to answer through
successive approximations both here and in the next section. To begin, we
need to refer more explicitly to the crucial role that the institution of incom-
plete contracts generally plays for economic organization.
Just like in its organizational counterpart, in the SGT contractual incom-
pleteness is dominantly seen negatively, for it leaves scope for parasitic behav-
ior, such as opportunism, rent seeking, and shirking. When one desires to
achieve a specific objective, it is suggested that an organizational contract is
a self-imposed constraint grounded on the belief that there can be gains from
trade if one credibly commits to certain behaviors. It is a means to promote
specialization because allowing for too much flexibility in action can be
equivalent to limiting the ability of others to plan their own purposive action.
By limiting the feasible set, parties can make themselves better off. This is
a counterintuitive result that rests on the belief that too much flexibility in
action is equivalent to limiting the ability of others to plan their own purpo-
sive action. This is why the longer contracts of vertical integration are said
to effectively supplant the spot contracts of market relations.16
Fortunately, analogously to our overarching organizational discussion,
we need not elaborate a theory of incomplete contracts from scratch to show
that they also have a positive property. The seminal article of economic orga-
nization theory, namely, “The Nature of the Firm,” is clear.
[Owing] to the difficulty of forecasting, the longer the period of the contract
is for the supply of the commodity or service, the less possible, and indeed,
the less desirable it is for the person purchasing to specify what the other con-
tracting party is expected to do. It may well be a matter of indifference to the
person supplying the service or commodity which of several courses of action
is taken, but not to the purchaser of that service or commodity. But the pur-
chaser will not know which of these several courses he will want the supplier
to take. Therefore, the service which is being provided is expressed in general
terms, the exact details being left for a later date. All that is stated in the con-
tract is the limits to what the person supplying the commodity or service is
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expected to do. The details of what the supplier is expected to do are not stated
in the contract but are decided later by the purchaser. When the direction of
resources (within the limits of the contract) becomes dependent on the buyer
in this way, that relationship which I term the “firm” may be obtained. . . . A
firm is likely, therefore, to emerge in those cases where a very short-term con-
tract would be unsatisfactory. It is obviously of more importance in the case
of services—labor—than it is in the case of the buying of commodities. In the
case of commodities, the main items can be stated in advance and the details
which will be decided later will be of minor significance. (Coase 1937, 391-2)
In this passage, Coase highlights how the longer incomplete contracts
that characterize the firm are instruments of flexibility, of adjustment to
unforeseen contingencies, and of continuous bargaining.17 Moreover, the
more abstract or uncertain the nature of the transactional relationship that
ties contractual parties, the more likely that spot contracts will be sup-
planted by those of the firm. Thus, the fundamental Coasean proposition is
that the “distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price
mechanism” (Coase 1937, 389).
Rephrasing Coase’s proposition according to our suggested framework, we
may say that the market is more likely to be superseded by a knowledge-to-
rights-to-act governance structure the more uncertain or ignorant we are about
our alternatives. More generally, on account of their incompleteness, the long-
term contracts typical of internal organization governance structures facilitate
adaptation through learning thanks to trial-and-error problem solving.18
But the relative ability of an organization to learn through experimentation
is a function of the nature of its attendant contracts. Even though an organiza-
tion itself may be considered as a type of heuristic devised to solve a set of
related problems having to do with specific organizational ends, the degree of
decision right autonomy is a relative, not an absolute, matter. For instance, the
more complex is the problem faced, the more probable it is that we need to
rely on the knowledge of others through some degree of decentralization to
attempt to solve it. Such reliance is a fortiori necessary, moreover, the more
uncertain we are about a problem’s structure: the more an (efficient?) organi-
zation needs to discover previously unknown solution heuristics, the more it
will decentralize, other things constant.19 This is tantamount to asserting that
the greater the extent of contractual incompleteness, the greater the devolution
of knowledge to rights to act.
Notice, furthermore, that considering the positive role of organizational
contracts implies also recognizing that, within an individual organization, the
degree of decision right autonomy is not (or should not be) invariable. To be
more specific, an organization’s survival requires that its colocations change
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through time as the nature of the problem faced changes, as new problems
emerge, and as organizational knowledge grows.20 In terms of Figure 2, this
means that within a “healthy” organization, we would expect to see the degree
of decision right autonomy shifting along the spectrum as situations demand—
a shifting that is made possible also on account of incomplete contracts.
This section has made the general point that incompleteness of organiza-
tional contracts favors the formation of conjectures through the devolution
of knowledge to rights to act. In addition, incompleteness favors the pro-
ductive employment of the solution when it is reached—or, in a word, learn-
ing. If organizational contracts were complete, then it would be impossible
to accommodate the new knowledge that could emerge through experimen-
tation. An organization, if it could exist at all in a complete contract world,
would accordingly come to a halt because it would not be able to discover
and adjust to contingencies and hence to endure. The incompleteness of
longer, organizational contracts is therefore an incentive to experiment.
Intergovernmental Grants
as Incomplete Contracts
We must now more specifically ask whether there is a fiscal federalism
counterpart to incomplete contracts. The answer, I submit, is yes.
The institutional nature of grants—that is, intergovernmental grants as
contractual payments among levels of government—was, to the best of my
knowledge, first alluded to by Breton and Scott (1978). But it is Brennan and
Pincus (1990) who come closest to articulating a contractual theory of grants.
In their attempt to explain the so-called “flypaper effect” (that, contrary
to the predictions of theory, the evidence suggests that lump-sum money
transfers among levels of governments stick where they hit), Brennan and
Pincus suggest considering grants as implicit contracts. In essence, they
convincingly argue that a grant can be considered as an open-ended bar-
gaining instrument. They ground this argument on knowledge grounds: the
study of the external workings of an institution (e.g., a grant) reveals very
little, if anything, about its internal functioning or about how its formal and
informal rules and payoff mechanisms work. As a result, they suggest that
a grant is often just an instrument of compromise in anticipation of future
reciprocal gains. The point to highlight for our purposes is this: a grant may
per se be considered a preference revelation mechanism. The selection of
type of grant by the donor can send a message to the recipient that to basic
price-and-allocation theory would break down, assuming it were possible for
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such theory to articulate it at all in terms of a sufficient statistic: by specifying
the type of grant, the donor is (implicitly or otherwise) communicating a
preferred spending pattern to the recipient. The flexibility nature of incom-
plete contracts here enters the stage in its most familiar way: a grant is often
just an implicit manifestation of exchange because it embodies a quid pro
quo message not otherwise expressible.21
Clearly, such interpretation also implies that all grants are at base condi-
tional. To clarify: if a grant is always at base an implicit contract then, no matter
its explicit type (e.g., general revenue, specific-purpose nonmatching, and
matching), it always conditions the behavior of the recipient. And the condi-
tionality of grants can crowd out experimentation (Breton [1985] 1987, 312-5;
Breton 1996, 258). However, the real crux of the matter is that the amount of
conditionality (analogously to contractual incompleteness) is not monolithic
but can, within the natural bounds dictated by our limited cognition, be varied.
Grants, like contracts, are not all the same. Just as the extent of incom-
pleteness differs for type of contract, so too it differs for type of grant. For
example, one expects a constitution to be vaguer than a spot contract and an
unconditional block grant to be vaguer than a detailed conditional one. If this
is so, it is only rational to attempt to make productive use of the extent of
incompleteness. The extent of grant incompleteness can indeed serve as a
policy tool. It can be used by a central government in a federation to induce
different levels of experimentation from its local governments.
In a setting of transparent preference revelation with a well-defined
objective function, it is possible to perform comparative-static analyses to
see the shifts in the point of tangency of a local community’s budget con-
straint with its iso-welfare curves between a public good and all other
goods. Since this is practically an exercise that is fully analogous to the
familiar procedure in consumer choice theory, it is straightforward to show
that, if interjurisdictional spillover benefits are present, then the income
effect engendered by a no-strings-attached block grant produces inferior
welfare benefits vis-à-vis a substitution effect engendered by a conditional,
matching grant (Oates 1972, chap. 3).
In a setting of less than perfect information, however, it is less trivial to
define optimality in every point in time. Moreover, there may exist cases
when it is not obvious how to even set up or crisply isolate the problem that
one wishes to solve. In these other cases, more experimentation may be called
for, and more experimentation may in effect depend on greater autonomy, as
opposed to greater restriction, of behavior. Such objective can be achieved by
a higher level of grant incompleteness (less conditionality) as opposed to a
higher level of grant completeness (more conditionality).
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The benefits of local-level experimentation are especially evident in U.S.
environmental policy.22 Environmental problems are not homogeneous but
vary according to moment and location. They accordingly require “the knowl-
edge of the particular circumstances of time and place” (Hayek 1945, 521) to
be solved. Often, such knowledge comes only from specific trial-and-error
learning. Thus, many U.S. states have become environmental laboratories, and
the results of the local experimentation have spilled over among the states and
have shown their fruits in many “green” sectors. For example, at the level of
air pollution control, hazardous waste cleaning, and park management the pos-
itive results of state-level policy outweigh national ones.
But what is perhaps more interesting in this context is that such state-
level policy experimentation is occurring, notwithstanding the inertia of the
federal government to abandon its one-size-fits-all approach. National envi-
ronmental standards set by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are
actually limiting the degree of environmental policy innovation. The EPA
standards in fact condition state behavior through sanctions, such as the loss
of federal subsidies for highway construction. The limit to a more extensive
devolution of environmental policy is justified on grounds of the “race to
the bottom” argument. Such argument rests on the assumption that if we let
local jurisdictions autonomously search and compete with each other in the
hope of discovering the most appropriate policies, then there will actually
be a wasteful outcome. It is suggested that this is so because states would
attempt to attract and preserve new business investments by decreasing
taxes and offering lax environmental standards, and this would lead to sub-
optimal results (e.g., shortages of local public goods and decreases in envi-
ronmental quality). The evidence, however, shows that the opposite is
taking place. Thus, it highlights and favors the reverse argument: rather
than a centralization through federal standards, what seems necessary to
maintain and improve the factual “race to the top,” as Oates (2002) and oth-
ers call it, is a policy of greater devolution through grants.
The recent Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act, more simply known as the 1996 U.S. welfare reform, offers another
concrete illustration of how a disposition to spread risk over parallel con-
jectures through increased devolution can be beneficial.23 Among other
changes, the reform in fact replaces the jointly administered state/federal
Aid to Families with Dependent Children matching grant program intro-
duced in the 1930s with a relatively loose new system of block grants, the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant. The
expanded vagueness of grant incompleteness—namely, the move from
more to less conditional grants—appears to have created higher powered
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incentives for local governments to try to solve various problems (e.g.,
unemployment and poor relief).
To point the spotlight on the exchange nature of grants does not simultane-
ously mean proposing a sort of beggar-thy-central-government policy stance
that leads to a race to the bottom in another form. Quite the contrary is the
case. As was said earlier, the suggested organizational approach entails that the
more we decentralize, the more probable it is that the incentive alignment
problem will be solved as well. In a federal system, it is in fact in the interest
of the recipient government to competently use donated funds with few strings
attached. As with all instances of exchange, failure to do so signifies that the
gains from trade engendered thanks to an intergovernmental grant are not rec-
iprocal. If this is so, then there is no reason for a central government to con-
tinue in such a transactional relationship. As Wicksell (1958 [1896], 89)
concisely asserted long ago, it “would seem to be a blatant injustice if some-
one should be forced to contribute toward the costs of some activity which
does not further his interests or may even be diametrically opposed to them.”
Without wanting to push the point too far in the present article, let us note
that the absence of a Wicksellian “blatant injustice” in intergovernmental
exchange (or the ability to use donated funds “competently” by a recipient
government) does not necessarily mean coincidence with the outcomes pre-
dicted by the median voter assumption. Intergovernmental grants are charac-
terized by complex political equilibria. Take the flypaper effect. According to
our suggested approach, we would expect to see the correspondence between
the effect of an increase in income and of a federal grant of the same amount
on a public budget (i.e., the absence of a flypaper effect) in two cases: when
grants are not considered as institutions or when information is perfect.
Ultimately, however, these two cases boil down to one for they rest on a
common assumption that there is no knowledge problem. When grants are
not considered as institutions, we are throwing away useful information about
the nature of politics. When information is perfect, there is no difference: it
means that individual and collective preferences match or that the problem
faced is well defined. Fundamentally, then, one would expect to see the
absence of a flypaper effect only if there is no room for knowledge gains.
From another perspective, one could plausibly argue that the flypaper
effect is actually a cost attached to the solution of a bargaining problem, and
that to consider such a solution “inefficient” and to opt, for example, for a cen-
tralized governance structure in the attempt to go back to the “efficient” path
is to propose a policy that does not consider the complete costs of the alter-
native governance structures (Demsetz 1969; Pelikan 1988). Again, the
issue is a comparative institutional one. The knowledge benefits from
Garzarelli / Cognition, Incentives, and Public Governance 251
PFR285593.qxd  3/22/2006  11:03 PM  Page 251
decentralization (with their possible “inefficiencies”) may outweigh the static
“efficiencies” of centralization.
I therefore hope it is clear that the cognitive or knowledge-based orga-
nizational approach to fiscal federalism presented here is not idealistic or
secondary to that of incentives. Hamilton’s early statement on taxation
remains a fine encapsulation of the pragmatic importance of knowledge in
matters of public governance.
There is no part of the administration of government that requires extensive
information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of political economy,
so much as the business of taxation. The man who understands those princi-
ples best will be least likely to resort to oppressive expedients, or sacrifice
any particular class of citizens to the procurement of revenue. It might be
demonstrated that the most productive system of finance will always be the
least burdensome. There can be no doubt that in order to a judicious exercise
of the power of taxation, it is necessary that the person in whose hands it
should be acquainted with the general genius, habits, and modes of thinking
of the people at large, and with the resources of the country. And this is all
that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge of the interests and feelings of
the people. In any other sense the proposition has either no meaning, or an
absurd one. And in that sense let every considerate citizen judge for himself
where the requisite qualification is most likely to be found. (Hamilton, Jay,
and Madison [1787-1788] 2001, Paper No. 35: 172)
Conclusion
This article has tried to level the theoretical balance within the emerging
SGT by highlighting that an organizational approach applied to the study of
the vertical structure of the public sector is able to include the laboratory role
played by federalism too. As such, it suggests that efficacious economic
organization not only constrains unproductive behavior but also enables pro-
ductive behavior through the devolution of knowledge to rights to act. In
developed economies, such devolution—the extent of which can be varied
according to type of intergovernmental grant—can create incentives for
learning about and discovering previously unknown alternatives. In sum-
mary, the article establishes a first approximation argument that shows that
we have the industrial and economic organization theoretical machinery to
also endogenize the laboratory role of fiscal federalism within the SGT.
Let us conclude by noting that the analysis does not entail that within a
federal organizational system some experimentation cannot take place at the
level of the central government. For example, the central government in the
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United States has undertaken a number of social experiments, such as the
1960s negative income tax and the housing vouchers. An interesting issue to
expand upon from a more explicit organizational stance concerns what kinds
of experiments should take place at the different levels of government.
Notes
1. On the general theoretical notion of institutional and organizational trial-and-error learning,
see especially Nelson and Winter (1977).
2. Echoing Viscount Bryce, Justice Louis D. Brandeis asserted in a dissenting 1932 opin-
ion that man “is weak and his judgment is at best fallible. . . . Yet the advances in the exact sci-
ences and the achievements in invention remind us that the seemingly impossible sometimes
happens. There are many men now living who were in the habit of using the age-old expres-
sion: ‘It is as impossible as flying.’ The discoveries in physical science, the triumphs in inven-
tion, attest the value of the process of trial and error. In large measure, these advances have
been due to experimentation. In those fields experimentation has, for two centuries, been not
only free but encouraged. Some people assert that our present plight is due, in part, to the lim-
itations set . . . by courts upon experimentation in the fields of social and economic science;
and to the discouragement to which proposals for betterment there have been subjected other-
wise. There must be power in the states and the nation to remould, through experimentation,
our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs. . . . To
stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right
to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country” (New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 1932). See also the opinions of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr. in Abrams v. United States (1919) and Truax v. Corrigan (1921) who, dis-
senting, defended the experimental nature of the First and the Fourteenth Amendments,
respectively. Justice Brandeis agreed with Justice Holmes in these cases.
3. See Weingast (1995), Crémer, Estache, and Seabright (1996), Seabright (1996), Saiegh
and Tommasi (2000), and Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (2003).
4. Oates (forthcoming) places the first-generation theory (FGT) and the second-genera-
tion theory (SGT) into a broader context.
5. We will return to the general Public Choice view of political organization toward the
end of our story.
6. On Ostrom’s contribution to polycentric governance, compare also the June 2005 spe-
cial issue of the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 57 (2).
7. Sources of inspiration are such classics as Coase (1937, 1960), Hayek (1948), Simon
(1951, [1962] 1998), Demsetz (1969), and Dahlman (1979).
8. Some representative contributions within this organizational literature are Richardson
(1972), Nelson and Winter (1977), Teece (1980), Dosi (1988), Pelikan (1988), Egidi (1992),
Langlois (2002), and Langlois and Robertson (1995).
9. For an attempt to link Tiebout (1956) to the SGT, see Garzarelli (2004).
10. Compare Coase (1960), Demsetz (1969), Dahlman (1979), Pelikan (1988), and Langlois
(2002).
11. Vihanto (1992) presents a theory of federalism as a discovery procedure.
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12. Compare the following statement by two economists who contributed to the principal-
agent tradition. A “decisionmaker may not know the alternatives that are available or even
those that might possibly be available, and may be forced to rely on interested parties for sug-
gestions. Such uncertainties make it impossible to formulate prior beliefs about the set of alter-
natives, and so rule out the use of Bayesian decision theory. Uncertainty of this kind is an
important aspect of reality” (Milgrom and Roberts 1986, 30).
13. To my knowledge, the first application of evolutionary principles to public as opposed
to private economic contexts was done by Forte (1982), which to this day remains a rather
neglected contribution.
14. Of course, there are many more variables that may shift the balance: for example, urgency
of problem solving or nongradual environmental variation may actually require more central-
ization (Bolton and Farrell 1990).
15. For an argument that approximates this one in the related context of supranational
federalism, see Casella (1999).
16. See, for example, Langlois and Robertson (1995) and Garzarelli and Limam (2003).
17. For a full-blown defense of this point, see Langlois and Foss (1999).
18. On the idea that an organizational hierarchy learns because it is an instance of problem
solving, see Simon ([1962] 1998), Loasby (1976), Egidi (1992), and Foss (1996).
19. To compete in the PC market in the early 1980s, for example, IBM did exactly this (see
Langlois and Robertson 1995, chap. 5).
20. Madison also alludes to this, especially in Paper No. 38 of The Federalist (Hamilton,
Jay, and Madison [1787-1788] 2001, 186-93). As Ostrom (1987, 47) sums it up in his exege-
sis, “Fallible decision makers must anticipate the possibility of a reconsideration of their situ-
ation, a reformulation of their problems, and a change of strategies in light of experience and
new information. The condition of human fallibility requires analysis, reason, deliberation,
choice, experience, reconsideration, and an opportunity to alter, amend, or change as new
information and new understanding give rise to new possibilities. Human life and the consti-
tution of political institutions, as Madison indicates . . . , can never be more than a provisional
experiment subject to change in light of experience.”
21. It is in this guise—the politics as exchange view—that the more general Public Choice
organizational view has reentered our story.
22. The environmental discussion that follows mostly draws on Oates (2002).
23. A succinct economic treatment of such reform is Blank (1997).
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